周波：是时分要求美国、北约和俄罗斯“不首要运用”核武器了

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导读：4月25日，《南华早报》网站宣告清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员、我国论坛特约专家周波的谈论文章“World needs ‘no first use’ pledge by US, Nato and Russia to avoid nuclear war。周波主张，若中美之间可以到达互不首要运用核武器的协议，不只可以作为中美树立战略安稳的第一步，也能使美国、北约和俄罗斯之间更简单到达相关协议。为了让俄罗斯参加到“不首要运用”的许诺中，美欧跨大西洋联盟可以首要保证不对俄首要运用核武器。我国论坛授权翻译，以飨读者。

【文/观察者网专栏作者周波】

核武器的重要性又一次显而易见。俄总统普京宣告的核打击重磅正告，让人们感觉到现在评论核裁军完全是白费的。可以想见，朝鲜是怎么在为自己现已开展了核武器而幸亏。人们不由猜想，下一个或许出现在亚洲或许中东区域的拥核国家究竟是哪一个。

咱们正在踏入一个核森林，在那里，一枚枚核弹如低垂的果实，诱人地摇曳着。可是，如五个核大国在一月份的联合声明中所誓词的，“核战役不或许赢，也决不能打”，那么一个实际可行的办法是，五个核大国保证不首要对对方运用或要挟运用核武器。

这对一切核大国来说都是或许的，因为这不会影响到它们的有用震慑力。自1964年引爆核装置以来，我国一向许诺在任何时候、任何状况下都“不首要运用”核武器。我国以为本国核战略和核方针是核大国中最为安稳、最为连接且最可猜测的。

美国总统拜登此前坚持，美国核武库的仅有方针是震慑，只在必要时才发起核进犯用于报复，该态度与“不首要运用”方针非常挨近。不过上个月，美国国防部在其《核态势评价陈述》中宣告，“只要在极点状况下才会考虑运用核武器，以保卫美国或其盟友和同伴的重要利益”，这与拜登之前的态度比较是一种后退。

美国比任何其他国家都更有才能做出不首要运用核武器的许诺，因为它具有压倒性的惯例兵力优势。人们很难找出一个美国无法用惯例武器完结的使命。

在西太平洋区域，我国人民解放军和美军惯例兵力间的距离正在缩小，但很难幻想在潜在的抵触中，美国不得不首要对我国发起核打击。

最关怀美国核方针的是美国的盟友，他们忧虑失掉美国核保护伞后本国的安全。但基辛格常说：“大国不会为了他们的盟友而自杀”。

美国的盟友倒也不用忧虑。因为对任何美国盟友的核打击简直必然会引起毁灭性的核报复，对手首要发起核进犯的概率很小。假如美国能与朝鲜商洽到达“不首要运用核武器”协议，反而或许阻挠平壤进一步开展核武器。

彼此保证“不首要运用”可以作为北京和华盛顿之间树立战略安稳的第一步。据报道，五角大楼忧虑我国的核武库到2030年或许添加两倍，到达1000枚核弹头。

就算这是真的，我国的核武器数量同美国比较也很小。要想到达核均势，我国有必要大幅添加其核武器数量，或许美国有必要将其核武器数量削减到我国的水平。这两种状况都不或许发生。

真实的应战是怎么让俄罗斯参加进来。1982年6月，苏联领导人勃列日涅夫在联合国做出了“不首要运用核武器”的许诺，那是因为苏联在与北约坚持的欧洲战场上，对本身的惯例兵力优势充满了决心。跟着1989年苏联崩溃后俄罗斯惯例兵力日薄西山，俄罗斯在1993年抛弃了这一许诺。

假如俄罗斯以为其“先晋级后降级”的战略阻挠了美国派兵干涉乌克兰，那么它需求三思。不管核武器看起来多有震慑力，美国也没有打赢越南、伊拉克或阿富汗战役。

核武器也没有协助莫斯科下降乌克兰面临俄侵略时的激烈反抗。相反，普京关于或许运用核武器的要挟，严峻损害了俄罗斯的国家形象。在2018年的一部纪录片中，普京问道：“若没有了俄罗斯，还要国际干什么？”。可以反诘一句：若没有这个国际，俄罗斯又会在哪里？

欧洲的安全取决于俄罗斯和北约是否能终究到达协议。美欧跨大西洋联盟可以单独面向俄罗斯许诺不首要运用核武器。俄罗斯比以往任何时候都更依靠核武器，但很难幻想俄罗斯会对一个具有30个成员国，其间还包含3个核国家的集团发起核打击。

2001年，我国和俄罗斯许诺互不首要运用核武器，也不将战略核导弹瞄准对方。假如中美之间可以到达相似的协议，那么美国、北约和俄罗斯之间到达协议将变得相对简单。

有一个值得学习的经历：1998年印度和巴基斯坦进行核试验后，我国和美国就两国核武器“互不瞄准”宣告了一项联合声明，以示联合。这进一步促进五个核武器国家于2000年宣告联合声明，宣告它们的核武器互不瞄准或不瞄准任何其它国家。

批评者或许会说，在未经核对的状况下互不瞄准仅有象征意义。但在核范畴，假如这能使核大国对它国安全承当道义上的职责，那这种象征意义也是有用的。不首要运用核武器的许诺将是核裁军的巨大进步，它让人们信任，一个没有核武器的国际，不管多么悠远，终有一天会成为或许。

翻译：祖白地亚

核译：许馨匀韩桦

Zhou Bo: World needs ‘no first use’ pledge by US, Nato and Russia to avoid nuclear war

Nuclear weapons look awfully important again. Given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s not-so-thinly veiled warning of a nuclear attack, it is a fool’s errand to talk about nuclear disarmament now. One can imagine that North Korea thinks it is fortunate to have developed nuclear weapons, and one can only guess which would-be nuclear state might crop up next in Asia and the Middle East.

We are stepping into a nuclear jungle where nukes are like low-hanging fruit swaying enticingly. But if “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, as the five nuclear powers vowed in a joint statement in January, then one realistic step is that they pledge not to be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against each other.

This is possible for all nuclear powers as it won’t compromise their effective deterrence. Since it detonated a nuclear device in 1964, China has pledged a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It says its nuclear strategies and policies are the most stable, sustainable and predictable among the nuclear powers.

The US Department of Defence announced last month in its Nuclear Posture Review that it “would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners”. Such a view is a step back from US President Joe Biden’s previous position that the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal is deterring – and if necessary, retaliating against – a nuclear attack. Such a position is only a stone’s throw from a no first use policy.

The United States can afford to make a no first use commitment more than any other country because it has overwhelming conventional military superiority. One can hardly cite a mission the US could not accomplish with conventional weapons.

The gap between the conventional forces of the People’s Liberation Army and the US military is closing in the western Pacific, but it is difficult to imagine a potential conflict in which the US would have to launch a nuclear strike first against China.

The primary concern over America’s nuclear policy comes from US allies who are worried about their security without the American nuclear umbrella. “Great powers don’t commit suicide for their allies”, as Henry Kissinger is often quoted as saying.

They do not have to worry. Knowing a nuclear strike on any US ally will almost certainly invite a devastating nuclear retaliation, an adversary is unlikely to launch a nuclear strike first. If the US could negotiate a “no first use” agreement with North Korea, it might discourage Pyongyang from further developing nuclear weapons.

Mutual assurance on no first use can serve as the first step in establishing strategic stability between Beijing and Washington. The Pentagon reportedly worries that China could triple its nuclear arsenal to 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.

Even if this turns out to be true, China’s nuclear stockpile is still only a fraction of that of the US. To talk about nuclear equilibrium, China would have to drastically increase its number of nuclear weapons or the US would have to reduce its stockpile to China’s level. Neither is possible.

The real challenge is how to get Russia involved. In June 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev made the no first use pledge at the United Nations because Moscow was confident about the advantages of its conventional military forces on the battlefield over Nato in Europe. As the Russian conventional military forces deteriorated after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Russia dropped its pledge in 1993.

If Russia believes its “escalate to de-escalate” strategy has deterred the US from sending troops to intervene in Ukraine, it needs to think again. No matter how formidable nuclear weapons seem, they did not help the US in Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan.

They have not helped Moscow in mitigating Ukraine’s strong resistance against Russia’s invasion, either. Instead, Putin’s threat on the possible use of nuclear weapons has severely tarnished the image of Russia. In a 2018 documentary, Putin asked, “why do we need a world without Russia in it?”. The better question is, where would Russia be without the world?

Security in Europe rests on whether Russia and Nato can eventually make a deal. The transatlantic alliance can afford to pledge no first use, even unilaterally, against a Russia which relies on nuclear weapons more than ever. It is hard to imagine why Russia would in any circumstances launch a nuclear strike against a grouping that has 30 member states, including three with nuclear weapons.

In 2001, China and Russia agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other or target strategic nuclear missiles against each other. If a similar agreement could be made between China and the US, then reaching an agreement between the US, Nato and Russia would become easier.

Here is a good lesson to learn. In the wake of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, China and the US came to a joint declaration that they would not target each other with their nuclear weapons to demonstrate solidarity. This led to a joint statement among the five nuclear-weapon states in 2000 that their nuclear weapons are not targeted at each other or at any other states.

Critics might argue that de-targeting weapons without verification is only symbolic. But, in the nuclear arena, even symbolism is useful if it holds the nuclear powers morally responsible for the security of others. A pledge of no first use is a huge step forward in nuclear disarmament. It tells us a nuclear weapon-free world, however distant, is still possible one day.

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret) is a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert

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